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I. ISSUES AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issues∗
Taha Yassin Ramadan (“Ramadan”) was tried along with Saddam Hussein and
other co-defendants in the Dujail Trial of the Iraqi High Tribunal (“IHT”).1 His life
sentence was later changed to a death sentence, prompting controversy.2 Assuming
Ramadan to have been in the custody of the United States under a custodial memorandum
of understanding, the Iraqi High Tribunal inquires as to the United States’ options and
responsibilities if Ramadan were to file a habeus petition in the United States. The IHT
also inquires as to whether there is any legal obstacle to the transfer of custody of
Ramadan from the United States to Iraq. Finally, the IHT is interested in whether
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld bears upon Ramadan’s case.

B. Summary of Conclusions
1. The IHT’s re-sentencing of Ramadan was condemned by many
international organizations and legal experts as contrary to
international standards of fair trial processes and in contravention to
international law and Iraq’s treaty obligations.
∗

Taha Ramadan is in US custody at the request of the Iraqi government. For purposes of this question
assume that he is being held by the US as a common criminal under a memo of understanding with Iraq and
that this is a custodial arrangement only. If the IHT trial chamber increases the sentence to Taha Ramadan
at the direction of the Appeals Chamber and the US concludes that the sentence is the result of a denial of
fair trial rights of the accused and that the accused will suffer irreparable prejudice if the sentence is carried
out, must the US release custody of Taha to the Iraq government? Must the US refuse to release custody?
Would Ramadan have the right to file a habeus petition and would the US have jurisdiction over such
petition? Does the Supreme Court decision in Hamdan bear on these issues?
1

Dujail Trial Decision, Iraqi High Tribunal, December 12, 2006 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 23].
2

Katerina Ossenova, Iraq Tribunal Sentences Saddam VP to Death, The Jurist, February 12, 2007,
available at: http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/02/iraqi-tribunal-sentences-saddam-vp-to.php
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 49].

1

Some human rights organizations, officials and legal experts have agreed with
Ramadan that his trial was flawed and unfair, and that his re-sentencing was in violation
of international law.3 Ramadan’s main arguments are as follows: the prosecution and
defense were not evenly matched in resources and treatment, he did not have the chance
to examine some witnesses, despite the testimony of these witnesses being read into the
record, his guilt was expounded by officials before the trial came to a close, curtailing his
right to a presumption of innocence, judge turnover and the murder of his defense
counsel reduced his ability to put on an effective defense, and, most importantly, while
there was stronger evidence against his co-defendants, there was not enough evidence to
convict Ramadan.4
Beside the controversies over the Dujail Trial itself, more severe criticism has
brewed over the resentencing of Ramadan. The resentencing occurred after the original
life sentence was annulled and the case was remanded for a stronger sentence, despite
that Ramadan did not appeal his original sentence. Many experts, human rights groups,
and organizations, have denounced the resentencing of Ramadan.5 Louise Arbour, the
United Nations’ High Commissioner for Human Rights, submitted an amicus curiae to
the IHT on Feb. 8, 2007, arguing that the re-sentencing of Ramadan to capital

3

Melissa Bancroft, Rights Group Urges Iraqi Court to Spare Saddam VP, The Jurist, Feb. 11, 2007.
[reproduced in accompanying Notebook at Tab 42]
4

Joshua Pantesco, Saddam VP Trial Unfair: UN Rights Expert, The Jurist, February 14, 2007, available at:
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/02/saddam-vp-trial-unfair-un-rights-expert.php . Hereinafter “UN
Rights Expert”. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 52];
Joshua Pantesco, Saddam Dujail Trial ‘Fundamentally Unfair’: HRW, The Jurist, November 20, 2006,
available at: http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/11/saddam-dujail-trial-fundamentally.php .
Hereinafter “HRW”. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 53]

5

Bancroft, supra [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 42]

2

punishment was in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”).6 In particular, she believes the re-sentencing violates Article 6, Article 7
and Article 14.7
2. Precedent suggests that US jurisdiction to review habeas petitions
filed by convicted IHT defendants should be refused, under the
doctrine of non-inquiry and the test that the Supreme Court
established in Hirota v. MacArthur and Flick v. Johnson.
The Supreme Court of the United States has unambiguously held that the United
States legal system shall not be used as an appellate chamber for foreign legal systems.8
In order to achieve US jurisdiction, a convicted IHT defendant would need to show that
his case differs from those contemplated in Hirota v. MacArthur and Flick v. Johnson, or
that evolving human rights standards should cause US courts to reconsider this line of
precedent.
The test established in Hirota v. MacArthur9, and later described in Flick v.
Johnson10 and Omar v. Harvey11 bars US courts from jurisdiction to consider writs of
habeas corpus filed by those convicted in foreign or international courts, who are held
abroad by international forces, even if the US is involved in their custody or was involved

6

Louise Arbour, Amicus Curiae Brief, In the Matter of Sentencing Taha Yassin Ramadan, United Nations
High Commissioner of Human Rights. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 70]
Id., referencing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature December
16, 1966, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1996), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29]

8

Hirota v. MacArthur, supra. [reproduced in accompanying at Tab 10]

9

Id.

10

Flick v. Johnson, supra. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5]

11

Omar v. Harvey, supra [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 16]

3

in creating the court that sentences them.12 Ramadan’s case seems to fit all of these
criteria, so he would have to prove an exceptional circumstance not considered in this
line of cases or convince US courts to narrow or alter this line of precedent in light of
evolving human rights standards and laws.
The doctrine of non inquiry, which is part of the basis for the holding in Hirota, is
a legal concept that suggests that courts should not review the validity or fairness of
convictions handed down by foreign courts. The doctrine is generally supported by the
arguments that review of foreign legal proceedings would be an attack on the sovereignty
of the foreign state, and that such an attack would be an improper venture by the courts
into political waters. Other arguments for non inquiry are that it may be impracticable to
investigate claims of foreign judicial improprieties and that the US courts do not wish to
be flooded with cases as though it were an appellate chamber for foreign legal systems.
3. The Supreme Court decision of Hamdan does not bear upon
Ramadan’s case.
The case of Hamdan13 held that the military commissions used at Guantanamo
Bay were not adequate tribunals and violated the laws of war because they did not meet
the Geneva Conventions or the UCMJ standards. One of the main jurisdictional issues in
Hamdan surrounds the Supreme Court’s authority to review the legitimacy of tribunals
created and run by the US military. Ramadan, and other convicted defendants of the
IHT, are not tried by a US military commission, so cannot use the same basis for
jurisdiction as could Hamdan. US military tribunals are entirely controlled by the US
executive branch, so the arguments over jurisdiction center on executive and judicial

12

Id.

13

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7]

4

spheres of power. Ramadan and his co-defendants are convicted by a foreign court, not in
the total control of the US executive branch, and so the line of cases that follow Hirota
are more relevant.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Taha Yassin Ramadan held various senior posts in Iraq’s Baath regime for 35 years,
ultimately becoming Saddam Hussein’s Vice President. He continued to hold this
position until Hussein’s government capitulated to multinational forces in 2003.14 Later
in 2003, Ramadan was captured in Mosul and handed over to the multinational forces.15
Ramadan was brought before the Iraqi High Tribunal, where he was tried in the Dujail
Trial, for crimes against humanity that occurred in the village of Dujail in 1967.16 He
was joined by several co-defendants including Saddam Hussein. Ramadan was convicted
on November 5, 2006, of murder, torture and forced deportation. Ramadan was
sentenced to life in prison, while three of his co-defendants were sentenced to death,
including Hussein.17
Hussein appealed his death sentence, but Ramadan did not appeal his life sentence.
The Appeals Chamber affirmed Saddam’s death sentence on December 26, 2006.18 In

14

Bernard Hibbitts, Ramadan Hanging Prompts Disavowal, Denunciation, The Jurist, March 20, 2007,
available at: http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/03/ramadan-hanging-prompts-disavowal.php
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44]

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Jeannie Shawl, Saddam VP asks Iraq Tribunal to Lift Death Sentence, The Jurist, March 14, 2007,
available at: http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/03/saddam-vp-asks-iraq-tribunal-to-lift.php
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 58]

18

Jeannie Shawl, Iraq Tribunal Upholds Death Penalty for Saddam VP as Lawyer Petitions US General,
The Jurist, March 15, 2007 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 57]

5

that decision, even though Ramadan had not appealed, the Appeals Chamber considered
Ramadan’s sentence and declared that the life sentence was too lenient, remanding
Ramadan’s sentence “for the purpose of strengthening the penalty against him and raising
it to the appropriate legal limit”.19
United Nations officials, legal experts and human rights groups such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch released statements condemning the Appeals
Chamber’s decision, and pled with the Trial Chamber to refuse to obey it.20 Ramadan
submitted arguments to the Trial Chamber focusing on the lack of evidence tying him to
the Dujail atrocities (beyond his possible involvement in the destruction of some
orchards), and drawing attention to some perceived procedural flaws in the Dujail Trial
and appellate processes.21
Since these questions were submitted to the War Crimes Lab, some important
developments in Ramadan’s case have transpired. On Feb. 12, 2007, the Trial Chamber
acquiesced to the Appeals Chamber’s demand, re-sentencing Ramadan to “hanging until
death”. The trial chamber announced that the new sentence would be appealed
automatically to the same appellate chamber that had required the increased
punishment.22

19

Dujail Trial Decision, Iraqi High Tribunal Appeals Chamber, Number 29/c/2006, December 12, 2006
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23]

20

Amnesty International, Iraq: Amnesty International Concerned About Possible Death Sentence for
Former Vice-President Taha Yassin Ramadan, Feb. 9, 2007 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
66]

21

Jomana Karadsheh and Joe Sterling, Ex-Hussein V.P.’s Sentence Switched from Life to Death, CNN, Feb.
12, 2007 [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 48]

22

Sabah Jerges, Former Iraq VP Ramadan sentenced to death, Agence France Presse, Feb. 12, 2007
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46]

6

Human rights organizations, UN officials and legal experts again expressed
denunciation regarding the re-sentencing, and beseeched the Appeals Chamber to
reconsider its position.23 Ramadan submitted a lengthy appeal on Mar. 11, 2007.24 Not
persuaded by these efforts, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the sentence that it had itself
demanded, on Mar. 15, 2007.25
Ramadan continued to seek to block his execution. He appealed to Iraqi President
Jalal Talabani for commutation of his sentence, possibly because Talabani personally
opposes the death penalty.26
Ramadan filed a petition for habeus corpus in the US, in an attempt to block transfer
of his custody from the US to the Iraqi High Tribunal.27 The US Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia found it does not have jurisdiction to hear Ramadan’s case, and
refused his petition.28
Ramadan also appealed directly to General David Petraeus, the US commander of
forces in Iraq, asking him to apply “natural justice” standards under the Geneva
Conventions and refuse orders to release Ramadan.29 Ramadan argued that “natural

24

Appeal of the Sentencing Order Issued By Trial Chamber One, Feb. 12, 2007 [reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 24]

25

Jeannie Shawl, Iraq Tribunal Upholds Death Penalty for Saddam VP as Lawyer Petitions US General,
The Jurist, March 15, 2007, Hereinafter “Tribunal Upholds Death Penalty”. [reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 58]

26

Id.

27

Ramadan v Rumsfeld, supra. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18]

28

Id.

29

Shawl, “Tribunal Upholds Death Penalty”, supra. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 57]

7

justice” standards would protect General Petraeus from prosecution for refusing to obey
orders.30
The US released Ramadan to Iraqi authorities, and he was executed by hanging,
before dawn on Mar. 20, 2007.31

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
International outcry regarding the re-sentencing of Ramadan is widespread, and
yet the US Courts are not capable of interfering in cases like Ramadan’s because they do
not have jurisdiction unless the Supreme Court narrows or overturns Hirota or the
District of Columbia’s District Court of Appeals narrows the cases that further defined
the Hirota test. Considering recent case history, such a shift in judicial policy seems
unlikely.
A. The Dujail Trial may have been flawed, and the later re-sentencing of
Ramadan may have been contrary to Iraq’s obligations under the
ICCPR, however the doctrine of non inquiry and relevant case law forbid
the United States from establishing jurisdiction to review habeus petitions
filed by defendants in Ramadan’s situation.
The Supreme Court case of Hirota v. MacArthur, and Flick v. Johnson and other
cases that follow Hirota prevent the US court system from acting as an appellate chamber
for foreign convictions. This is true even if the foreign trial was not conducted in
accordance US or international standards of justice. In order for a petitioner in
Ramadan’s situation to prevail in establishing US jurisdiction for a writ of habeas, the US
Supreme Court would have to overturn or narrow Hirota or the US Court of Appeals for

31

Bernard Hibbitts, Ramadan Hanging Prompts Disavowal, Denunciation, The Jurist, and Mar. 20, 2007.
[reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 44]

8

the District of Columbia would have to narrow Flick. Some scholars and human rights
activists advocate for these changes, in the interest of giving US courts more flexibility to
protect human rights, but such a drastic change is unlikely in the near future and multiple
recent cases conform to Hirota and Flick.32
Human rights organizations, and some officials and legal experts have voiced
serious criticisms regarding the fairness of the Dujail trial, and particularly the resentencing of Ramadan in its aftermath.
1. The UN High Commissioner of Human Rights, Louise Arbour,
has argued that Ramadan’s trial and re-sentencing are illegal
under the ICCPR.
UN High Commissioner of Human Rights Louise Arbour filed an amicus brief
with the Iraqi High Tribunal, arguing that a death sentence would be unfair to Ramadan
and a breach of Iraq’s obligations under the ICCPR.33 Iraq entered into the ICCPR on
Mar. 23rd, 1976, without establishing any reservations.34
Arbour identifies three covenants of the ICCPR that she believes would be
violated by the execution. She suggests that Article Fourteen35, which guarantees a fair
trial process and appellate procedures, has been violated by many procedural and other
shortcomings of the Dujail trial, including pre-conviction statements of Ramadan’s guilt,
lack of access to witnesses, frequent judge turn over, the murder of defense lawyers, and
the post-trial increase of punishment imposed by the Appeals Chamber.36

33

Louise Arbour, Amicus Curiae Brief, In the Matter of Sentencing Taha Yassin Ramadan, United Nations
High Commissioner of Human Rights [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 70]

34

Id. at 5-6.

35

Article Fourteen of the ICCPR, supra. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29]

36

Arbour, Supra at 4. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 70]

9

Arbour argues that Article Six37 of the ICCPR, which forbids arbitrary deprivation
of life and limits capital punishment, has been violated because the death penalty
sentence was the product of a trial involving so many Article Fourteen violations, and
because there was no possibility of pardon for Ramadan.38
Finally, Arbour contends that Article Seven39, which prohibits torture or other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, has been violated because the death sentence, as a
product of Article Fourteen violations, is illegitimate under Article Six, and causing the
fear of impending execution in a person who is not legitimately sentenced to death is
cruel or inhuman treatment.40 Additionally, she writes that the cruelty of Ramadan’s
death sentence is increased because of defects in the executions of his co-defendants,
including taunting and decapitation, and because Ramadan was not given sufficient
assurance or evidence that similar defects would not characterize his own execution.41
2. UN Special Rapporteurs Philip Alston and Leandro Despouy
each individually called for the abandonment of Ramadan’s
death sentence.
The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
Philip Alston (“Alston”), denounced Ramadan’s trial and death sentence as illegitimate.
Alston argued that official statements indicating Ramadan’s guilt before the conclusion
of the trial, in conjunction with the admission of witness testimony without the
37

Article Six of the ICCPR, supra. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29]

38

Arbour, Supra at 4. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 70]

39

Article Seven of the ICCPR, Section Four, supra. “Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek
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opportunity for cross-examination and other procedural shortcomings, collectively
amounted to an unfair trial and resulted in an illegitimate application of the death
penalty.42
Alston was later joined in this criticism by the UN Special Rapporteur on the
Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Leandro Despouy (“Despouy”). Despouy urged
the Iraqi government not to execute Ramadan due to “grave shortcomings” in Ramadan’s
trial and his re-sentencing.43
3. Human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch, the
International Center for Transitional Justice, and Amnesty
International have released statements condemning Ramadan’s
trial and sentence.
Human Rights Watch denounced the IHT Appeals Chamber’s decision to remand
Ramadan’s case to the Trial Chamber for re-sentencing, and urged the Trial Chamber to
spare Ramadan’s life despite the Appeals Chamber’s instructions.44 Human Rights
Watch and the International Center for Transitional Justice co-released a statement
declaring that the evidence against Ramadan in the Dujail trial was inadequate to justify
Ramadan’s sentence at all and that increasing his sentence after the trial and without an
appeal “reeks of vengeance”.45 After the Trial Chamber sentenced Ramadan to death,
and after Ramadan appealed his death sentence, Human Rights Watch urged the
Appellate Chamber to reconsider its position. Human Rights Watch maintained that its
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primary concern was the lack of evidence concerning Ramadan, but it also had many
concerns about the fairness of the Dujail Trial itself.46
Amnesty International issued a statement of concern declaring that the entire
Dujail Trial was unfair, particularly because of the multiple murdered defense lawyers,
and that the Appeals Chamber should not have increased Ramadan’s sentence.47
4. Some governments expressed their censure or lack of support
for the Appeals Chamber’s decision to resentence Ramadan.
The Foreign Ministry of Russia released a statement on March 20, 2007,
denouncing Ramadan’s execution as an unjust act that could hurt stability in Iraq.48 A
spokesperson for the US Embassy in Iraq distanced the US from the execution by saying
that the trial was “an Iraqi process and an Iraqi decision with respect to the sentence
being carried out”.49
B. Even if Ramadan’s trial was unfair or illegal, relevant case law suggests
that the United States does not have jurisdiction to review his habeus
petition.
Ramadan filed a habeus petition in the United States, on Feb. 9, 2007.50 The
petition was brought before the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, where
it was recently rejected, on Feb. 27, 2007.51 From the bench, the judge stated that US
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courts will not act as appellate chambers for foreign decisions, because to do so would be
a “collateral attack” on a foreign court.52 In reaching this conclusion, the judge relied
upon two World War II cases, Hirota v. MacArthur53 and Flick v Johnson54. These two
cases established a test that controls today and that precludes most petitions for writs of
habeas corpus filed by people convicted in foreign or international courts and held
overseas by multinational forces.
1. Hirota established the test for determining jurisdiction
in habeas petition cases where the petitioner seeks to
avoid custody transfer to a tribunal that has convicted
him or her in a court procedure.
Hirota took place in post-World War II occupied Japan. Petitioners were
Japanese citizens, convicted by a military tribunal in Japan, and held in custody in Japan,
who filed petitions for writs of habeas in the U.S.
The Supreme Court had already considered similar cases in Germany that same
year, and eight of the justices had established their positions on US jurisdiction for writs
of habeas corpus filed by convicted foreigners in zones occupied by the US and its allies.
Four justices believed US jurisdiction over these cases would be legitimate, four strongly
disagreed. The ninth justice, Justice Jackson, had recused himself from voting on any of
the German cases because he had “negotiated the charter under which the Nazi war
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criminals were tried”. 55 The result was a consistent tie. Without a majority in favor of
hearing the motions for writs of habeas petition, the default consequence was that none of
these cases achieved jurisdiction.
When Hirota came before the Supreme Court, the justices were likely to maintain
their previous positions regarding jurisdiction. Justice Jackson summarized their
positions: “Of course, they could not consistently, with equal justice under law, apply a
different jurisdictional rule to these cases than they have to those of the Germans”.56
In order to break the stalemate, Justice Jackson decided to participate in Hirota.
He explained that the Japanese war criminals were convicted under a different charter
than the one he had directly negotiated in Germany, so it would not be improper for him
to participate. Justice Jackson called for oral arguments to be heard regarding the
jurisdictional issues. Justice Jackson described his choice as “between two evils”. If he
voted with those who rejected jurisdiction, he felt that the consequences would be
“irrevocable” and the convicted Japanese people would be “executed and their partisans
will forever point to the dissents of four members of the Court”. He hoped that full oral
arguments might persuade one or more other justices to switch positions, bolstering “a
faint chance of avoiding dissents”.
After oral arguments concluded, Justice Jackson did not take part in the final
decision regarding Hirota’s motions. Nevertheless, the tie was broken. Justice Rutledge
delayed his own judgment, and then died without having announced his vote. Of the
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seven remaining justices, five joined in the opinion. The controlling opinion in Hirota is
only three paragraphs long.57
The International Military Tribunal for the Far East that convicted Hirota and the
other defendants was created by General MacArthur, but in creating the tribunal, General
MacArthur was deemed as not acting on the United States’ authority alone, but rather as
“an agent of the Allied Powers”.58 The court was therefore a multi-national tribunal and
the defendants were not US citizens, and were detained in Japan.59 Hirota holds that
when the defendants are foreigners, and the convicting court is not American, US courts
“have no power or authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and
sentences imposed on these petitioners”.60
2. Flick further described the test developed in Hirota,
and determined that custody of petitioner by U.S.
Armed Forces did not prevent petitioner from receiving
habeas preclusion under Hirota.
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“The petitioners, all residents and citizens of Japan, are being held in custody pursuant to judgment of a
military tribunal in Japan. Two of the petitioners have been sentenced to death, the others to terms of
imprisonment. They filed motions in this court for leave to file petitions for habeas corpus. We set all the
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fully presented and argued.
We are satisfied that the tribunal sentencing these petitioners is not a tribunal of the United States.
The United States and other allied countries conquered and now occupy and control Japan. General
Douglas MacArthur has been selected and is acting as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
The military tribunal sentencing these petitioners has been set up by General MacArthur as the agent of the
Allied Powers.
Under the foregoing circumstances the courts of the United States have no power or authority to
review, to affirm, set aside, or annul the judgments and sentences imposed on these petitioners and for this
reason the motions for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus are denied” Hirota v. MacArthur,
supra [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10]
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Flick is also factually similar to Ramadan in many ways. Flick involves a
German citizen convicted by a German court, in an American-occupied zone of post-war
Germany.61 Like Ramadan, Flick was a foreigner convicted abroad by a non-American
court and held in custody by the United States Armed Forces. Also like Ramadan, Flick
was tried for war crimes in a special tribunal developed at the conclusion of a war; Flick
was tried by the military tribunals at Nuremberg.62
Flick held that the US did not have jurisdiction to review Flick’s case because he
was sentenced by a foreign court, even though he was held in American custody. The
court was “German” but the German government was at the time led by a “control
council” composed of four commanders, each from one of four occupying countries, one
of which was the US. Although the court proceeding that convicted Flick derived its
authority from the control council, and although the US held a portion of that control
council power, the American ties were not sufficient to deem the court proceeding as
American or under US control.
The foreign status of the court was central to the holding in Flick. The court asks,
“was the court which tried and sentenced Flick a tribunal of the United States? If it was
not, no court of this country has power or authority to review, affirm, set aside or annul
the judgment and sentence imposed on Flick”.63 The court cites Hirota in posing this
question.64 In short, Flick holds that the Hirota test controls US jurisdictional authority

61

Flick v. Johnson, supra. [reproduced in accompanying notebook in Tab 5]

62

Id. at 6-7.

63

Id.

64

Id.

16

over non-citizens convicted by foreign courts, whether or not those non-citizens were
held in US custody.
3. In his petition for writ of habeus corpus, Ramadan
relied on Omar v. Harvey, which held that the US had
jurisdiction to entertain Omar’s habeus petition, but
Omar affirmed the Hirota test and the reasons Omar
was granted jurisdiction do not apply to Ramadan’s
factual situation.
Very recently, a third case, Omar v. Harvey,65 further explained and reinforced
the test developed in Hirota and Flick. In Omar, a US citizen petitioned for a writ of
habeus corpus after the US took him into custody in Iraq.66 In his petition, Ramadan
relied on Omar to establish jurisdiction for US consideration of his habeus petition.67
However, there are two major distinctions between Omar and Ramadan’s situations.
Omar was a US citizen and he had not yet been convicted, nor was he even charged by a
foreign court. Ramadan is not a US citizen, and has been convicted by a foreign court.
Omar specifically states that it is because Omar wasn’t convicted yet by a foreign court
and wasn’t a US citizen,68 that Omar’s petition is not barred by the test developed in
Hirota and Flick.69 Omar suggests that the heart of the Hirota court’s concern was that
“the petitions represented a collateral attack on the final judgment of an international
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tribunal”.70 As Omar had incurred no final judgment by any foreign court, there was no
final judgment to be attacked.
4. Ramadan’s case meets the criteria set forth in Hirota
and further defined in Flick and Omar for habeus
jurisdiction preclusion.
Ramadan meets all four criteria of the Hirota test, as delineated in Flick and
Omar; he has been convicted in a foreign court, and held in a foreign country by a
multinational force.
a. Ramadan has been convicted.
One of the criteria is easily clearly met. Ramadan was convicted of crimes
against humanity on Nov. 5, 2006.71 The satisfaction of this criterion sets Ramadan’s
apart from Omar.72
b. Ramadan’s case was held in a foreign country.
The criterion that the court must reside in a foreign country also appears to be
met. The IHT is a court that is indeed located in a “foreign country” outside of the US, as
it is in Iraq. It is possible that Ramadan or another defendant of the IHT could argue that
Iraq is largely controlled by the US, and is therefore not “foreign”. However, it does not
seem likely that such an argument would prevail because the US and its allies had more
direct control over occupied post-war Germany and Japan, and yet those countries were
found to be “foreign” in Hirota and Flick.73
c. The IHT is a foreign tribunal.
70
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Similarly, arguments that the IHT is not a court that is “foreign” to the US falter
when compared to the tribunals that were found to be foreign under Hirota and Flick.
While the US may have had influence in the creation of the IHT, and may even continue
to have influence over the court, the threshold for “foreignness” of the court is quite low.
In Hirota, it did not matter that General MacArthur, an American, had created the court
in question.74 In Flick it did not bear that the German court had derived its authority not
from Germany as a sovereign nation, but from a four-seat control council, of which the
US held a seat.75
d. Ramadan was held by a multinational force.
In Munaf v. Geren76, In Re Hussein77, and other recent cases, U.S. Courts have
held that those defendants who are convicted by Iraqi courts and detained in Iraq, are held
by multinational forces, and are not in U.S. custody.
In Re Hussein is an application for a temporary stay of execution, filed by
Saddam Hussein in the U.S. on December 29, 2006.78 His application cites his need to
remain temporarily alive in order to defend himself in a civil suit79 that was brought
against his estate in a US court. Hussein alleged that he was in fact in US Custody in
Iraq, and that therefore the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia had the power
to delay his execution. Hussein argued that the Court had this power not by exercising
74
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any authority over Iraqi officials, but through an enjoinment against the United States
Military and the United States Department of State, temporarily preventing them from
handing Hussein over to Iraq. The opinion states that although not “styled as such, he
sought this order under the legal framework of a petition for habeas corpus”.80
Hussein attempted to prove that he was in US custody in part by showing that his
access to his attorneys had been “at the discretion of the United States Military and
Department of State”.81 The court cited 28 U.S.C. § 224182 which provides that
jurisdiction over a writ of habeas corpus only exists if the petitioner is “in custody under
or by color of the authority of the United States”.83 The court finds that Hussein was not
under the custody or color of authority of the United States, concluding that “members of
the United States Military maintain custody over Petitioner Hussein pursuant to their
authority as members of Multi-National-Force-Iraq”.84
In Munaf, an extremely recent case, an American citizen who was convicted in an
Iraqi criminal court was found to be held not in US custody but “by United States
personnel serving as part of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (“MNF-I”)”.85 The case went
on to define the MNF-I as “a multinational force, authorized by the United Nations
Security Council that operates in Iraq in coordination with the Iraqi government”.86
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a. Ramadan’s actual petition for habeas corpus was
denied.
When Ramadan filed a petition for habeus corpus in the US, it was denied. The
US District Court for the District of Columbia cites Hirota, Flick, and Omar in its
decision.87 The Court concludes that it “lacks jurisdiction to consider a petition for a writ
of habeus corpus on behalf of this petitioner- a foreign citizen, detained overseas, with
the existence of a multinational force, and criminally convicted by a foreign court—
regardless of whether the United States can be deemed the custodian”.88
C. The Hirota test is supported by the somewhat controversial doctrine of
non inquiry.
The doctrine of non inquiry is a long-standing legal doctrine that forbids US
courts from interfering in the extradition of non-citizens who have been convicted
abroad, if the court’s reason for interference is based on an evaluation of the trial
standards of another country.89 While the transfer of Ramadan’s custody to Iraq may not
qualify as extradition, the concepts upon which the doctrine of non-inquiry is based apply
to Ramadan’s case as clearly as they would to an extradition case. The doctrine of non
inquiry demands that the courts not interject in what should be a political decision to
create and continue extradition treaties, and that the courts ought not to challenge the
rulings of other nations’ legal systems.
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Many reasons have been given for the implementation of the doctrine of non
inquiry around the world, and for its continuation in the US judicial system.
One major concern is the foreign relations fall out that could occur if US courts
entertain habeas petitions from those who have been convicted by foreign courts. If US
courts hear such petitions, and then decide to refuse extradition, and if they base such a
refusal on a case-by case appraisal on the legitimacy and fairness of the non-citizen’s
foreign conviction, the US courts would be essentially acting as an appellate chamber for
foreign courts. To act in this way may be, at the very least, considered disrespectful
toward the foreign country, or even perceived as a “collateral attack” upon that country’s
sovereignty.90
A related concern is that the courts would be solving political questions in
determining which foreign trials have been legitimate, and so would be engaging
unilaterally in foreign affairs, and violating the political question doctrine.91 After all,
extradition treaties are developed between states with the expectation that the executive
or legislative branches of the states’ respective governments have considered the
worthiness of each others’ legal systems and have found them to be adequate. Similarly,
the executive branch of the United States, alone or as part of the multinational forces that
it controls, has decided to hold some prisoners for the IHT, including those that are
convicted and awaiting capital punishment. Therefore, if the judicial branch interferes
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with the transfer of custody from the US to Iraq, it may be overruling a political decision
made by the executive branch.
Courts around the world have also defended the doctrine of non-inquiry on
practical grounds. They have claimed that it is not feasible for a court of one country to
investigate the alleged human rights abuses of another country, nor is it practicable for
courts to evaluate the protections inherent in the judicial procedures of other countries.
Courts may not have the time or resources for such an enterprise.92
The doctrine of non inquiry is not without controversy. Some legal scholars have
argued that the doctrine of non inquiry ought to be discarded or adjusted in light of
human rights concerns. These scholars argue that courts ought to have more flexibility to
promote human rights by refusing extradition of individuals who have suffered or will
suffer gross injustices or inhuman treatment abroad.93 They also argue that the doctrine
of non inquiry may be at odds with some treaty obligations, such as those adopted under
the Convention Against Torture.94 However, the courts have far from abandoned the
legal doctrine.
D. The Supreme Court decision of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld does not bear on
Ramadan’s case.
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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld95 does involve a foreign citizen plaintiff who was in US
custody, but the facts of the two cases are otherwise quite divergent. Hamdan was
captured by bounty hunters, at the US’s behest, and he was then held in the Guantanamo
Bay Naval Base.96 Ramadan, by contrast, was only placed in US custody under a
memorandum of understanding with Iraq, and at Iraq’s request.97 Hamdan was charged
with a crime but not yet convicted98, while Ramadan has been convicted, sentenced, and
resentenced. Hamdan’s case was before a military tribunal wholly controlled by the
United States, while Ramadan’s case came before an Iraqi court, the Iraqi High Tribunal.
The difference in venue is highly important, as the Hirota test only applies to those
convicted by foreign courts.99
Hamdan holds that the military commissions used at Guantanamo Bay were not
adequate tribunals and violated the laws of war because they did not meet the Geneva
Conventions or the UCMJ standards.100 It also holds that the President does not have
authority to set up such tribunals, and that the courts do have authority to review the
validity of these tribunals.101 The latter holding is the only true jurisdictional issue in
Hamdan.

95

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7]

96

Id.

97

This is according to the assumptions of the Issues submitted by the IHT for this memorandum, reprinted
in full at the beginning of this document.

98

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7]

99

Flick v. Johnson, supra. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5]

100

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, supra. [reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 7]

101

Id.

24

Ramadan was not tried by a US military commission, so he could not use the same
basis for jurisdiction as could Hamdan. Even if Ramadan has been in the custody of the
US, he had a foreign trial. Hamdan appears to have no bearing on Ramadan’s case,
because nothing in Hamdan would grant jurisdiction to someone convicted in a court that
is part of another country’s legal system. Indeed, Hamdan was not mentioned in the
court’s rejection of Ramadan’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.102

IV. CONCLUSION
All defendants of the IHT who file writs of habeas in the US after conviction are
likely to be denied, even if the convicted defendant is in US custody, or even if the
convicted person is a US citizen, as long as the Hirota precedent is not overturned or
narrowed by the US Supreme Court.
While some elements of the Hirota test have waned in importance, two factors, when
in conjunction, remain absolutely dispositive for habeas claim preclusion under US law;
if a defendant has received a conviction, and if that conviction comes from any court
other than one under total US control, the defendant’s habeas petition will be refused.
It is possible that the US Courts will change course and overturn or narrow Hirota
and its successors. Indeed, many human rights advocates argue for such change. And
while Hamdan may not be directly relevant to convicted IHT defendants, it may still
stand as an example that US courts are adjusting their jurisdiction.
However, in light of the many recent cases that refuse habeas to those convicted by
the IHT or other foreign courts, and considering the unambiguous support for Hirota and
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its successors that these cases describe, any major change in US policy toward petitioners
filed in foreign courts seems unlikely in the near future.
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